A secure and dependable dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) system based on the AES-GCM cipher is developed, where the reconfigurable IP cores are protected by encrypting and authenticating their bitstreams with AES-GCM. In DPR systems, bitstream authentication is essential for avoiding fatal damage caused by inadvertent bitstreams. Although encryption-only systems can prevent bitstream cloning and reverse engineering, they cannot prevent erroneous or malicious bitstreams from being accepted as valid. If a bitstream error is detected after the system has already been partly configured, the system must be reconfigured with an errorless bitstream or at worst rebooted since the DPR changes the hardware architecture itself and the system cannot recover itself to the initial state by asserting a reset signal. In this regard, our system can recover from configuration errors without rebooting. To the authors' best knowledge, this is the first DPR system featuring both bitstream protection and error recovery mechanisms. Additionally, we clarify the relationship between the computation time and the bitstream block size, and derive the optimal internal memory size necessary to achieve the highest throughput. Furthermore, we implemented an AES-GCMbased DPR system targeting the Virtex-5 device on an off-the-shelf board, and demonstrated that all functions of bitstream decryption, verification, configuration, and error recovery work correctly. This paper clarifies the throughput, the hardware utilization, and the optimal memory configuration of said DPR system.
Introduction
Some recent Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) provide the ability of dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) , where a portion of the circuit is replaced with another module while the rest of the circuit remains fully operational. By using DPR, the functionality of the system is reactively altered by replacing hardware modules according to, for example, user requests, performance requirements, or environmental changes. embedded decryptors and can be configured using encrypted bitstreams. However, such embedded decryptors are available only for the entire configuration and not for DPR. In addition to bitstream encryption, bitstream authentication is significant for protecting DPR systems [7] . Encryption-only systems are not sufficiently secure as they cannot prevent erroneous or malicious bitstreams from being used for configuration. Since DPR changes the hardware architecture of the circuits, unauthorized bitstreams can cause fatal, unrecoverable damage to the system. In this regard, a mechanism of error recovery is essential for the practical use of DPR systems. If a bitstream error is detected after the bitstream has already been partly configured, the system must be reconfigured with an errorless bitstream. Note that the system cannot be recovered by asserting a reset signal since the hardware architecture itself has changed.
Based on the above considerations, we developed a DPR system which is capable of protecting bitstreams using AES-GCM (Advanced Encryption Standard [8]-Galois/ Counter Mode [9, 10]) and recovering from configuration errors. To the authors' best knowledge, a DPR system featuring all mechanisms of bitstream encryption, bitstream verification and error recovery has not yet been developed, although several systems without recovery mechanism have been reported so far [11, 12, 13] .
AES-GCM is one of the latest authenticated encryption (AE) ciphers which can guarantee both the confidentiality and the authenticity of message, and therefore AE could be effectively applied to DPR systems. Indeed, data encryption and authentication can be achieved with two separate algorithms, but if the area and speed performance of the two algorithms are not balanced, the overall performance is determined by the worse-performing algorithm. Therefore, AE is expected to enable more area-efficient and high-speed DPR implementations. Since other AE algorithms are not parallelizable or pipelinable, and thus not necessarily suitable for hardware implementation [14] , the use of AES-GCM is currently the best solution for protecting bitstreams.
The configuration of a downloaded IP core starts after its bitstream is successfully verified. Bitstreams of large IP cores are split into several blocks, and verification is performed for each block. If the bitstream verification of a particular block fails after some other blocks have already been configured, the configuration process is abandoned, and reconfiguration starts with an initialization bitstream. In this configuration method, the size of the split bitstream significantly influences both the speed and the area performance. Since the decrypted bitstream must not flow out of the device and is thus stored to the internal memory, the size of the split bitstream determines the required memory resources. Although it is often thought that the speed performance can be improved by increasing the size of the available memory, our study revealed that the overall throughput can be maximized by using optimally sized internal memory. This paper describes the architecture, memory configuration, implementation results, and performance evaluation of an AES-GCM-based DPR system featuring an error recovery mechanism. The system is implemented targeting Virtex-5 on an off-the-shelf board, and we demonstrate that its mechanisms of bitstream encryption, verification and error recovery work successfully. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces past studies on DPR security. Section 3 explains the process of partial reconfiguration of a Xilinx FPGA. Section 4 briefly explains the cryptographic algorithms related to our implementation. Section 5 describes the architecture of our
